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J.M. Gratale on Tore T. Petersen’s 
Richard Nixon, Great Britain and
the Anglo-American Alignment in
the Persian Gulf and Arabian
Peninsula
1 Tore T. Petersen. Richard Nixon, Great Britain and the Anglo-American Alignment in the Persian
Gulf and Arabian Peninsula: Making Allies out of Clients. Sussex Academic Press, 2009.  172pp.
 978-1-84519-277-8.
2 Since  the  events  of  9-11  there  has  been a  sizeable  quantity  of  books  published  on
American foreign policy in broad terms, as well as more focused studies on contemporary
developments in southwest Asia, more commonly referred to as the Middle East. Many of
these  volumes  are  highly  politicized,  being  either  scathingly  critical  of  the  Bush
administration or  unswervingly  supportive  of  that  administration’s  policies  part  and
parcel of the ‘War on Terror.’  There are, however, some exceptional studies that have
both a critical  and an insightful  approach to the complexities  of  the making of  U.S.
foreign policy. Walter L. Hixon’s The Myth of American Diplomacy, Stephen M. Walt’s Taming
American Power, and Andrew J. Bacevich’s The New American Militarism are analyses which
provide not only coverage of recent developments but impressively draw from America’s
historical  trajectory in order  to locate both lines  of  consistency and also ‘breaks’  or
‘interruptions’  in  how  the  U.S.  behaves  at  the  global  level.   This  ability  to  balance
synchronic and diachronic forces is not an easy exercise, but it is a vital element that
ought to be part of the historian’s repertoire.  In his book, Tore T. Petersen manages to
successfully incorporate these two elements by carefully retracing past American and
British policy initiatives in southwest Asia and inviting his readers to consider the long-
term consequences of these actions on present realities.
3 A number of other aspects of Petersen’s volume make it highly accessible to readers that
are not familiar with the topics he addresses, while simultaneously it is engaging enough
to  appeal  to  readers  that  are  acquainted  with  the  Middle  East  and  Anglo-American
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foreign policy practices in the region.  To begin with there are useful aids and features
such as maps, illustrations, and a listing of historical figures.  Secondly, it is more than
evident that this volume is a scholarly work; his footnotes and extensive bibliography
indicate the high level of research put into the project.  Thirdly, Petersen has produced
an engaging narrative.  His writing style is not overly elaborate, his explanations are to
the  point,  and  his  coverage  of  the  historical  figures  and  the  events  themselves  are
balanced.   Finally,  Petersen  convincingly  unravels  the  complex  web  of  diplomatic
relations that involved not only the governments of the U.S. and Great Britain, but also
the specific regimes in southwest Asia.  It is for these reasons that this volume provides
important coverage of a region and historical period that has been somewhat neglected
in recent years.
4 As indicated in the title, the book commences with the Nixon administration and the
Heath government.  While not providing a psychological profile of Nixon, Petersen does
manage to give the reader a sense of how the president viewed himself, those around
him, and the office which he held.  The peculiarity of his character, his Machiavellian
qualities, and his obsession with posterity—what the verdict of history will be on him and
his tenure as president—are all handled compellingly.  The author’s claims are supported
by  an  impressive  array  of  primary  source  excerpts  and  historiographical  coverage.
 Petersen for example makes the case that Nixon’s underlying ambition was “to put the
international system on a new footing…and to build a global structure of peace.”  (2)  Of
course in the context of the early 1970s this makes quite a lot of sense; the U.S. at the
time was struggling to remove itself from its failed war in Vietnam without having it
appear that the U.S. was defeated.  Simultaneously the U.S. was still engaged in the Cold
War  with  the  Soviet  Union,  and therefore,  Nixon was  compelled  to  ‘fight’  that  war.
 Hence, the Nixon doctrine, which stated that the U.S. “would honor its treaty obligations
and provide nuclear cover to its allies and economic and military assistance in lieu of
American troops” (6) served as a clear message to the Russians that the Cold War was still
‘on.’ In order to successful execute this war, the U.S. had to improve its relations with
Great  Britain  which  had  suffered  setbacks  since  the  1956  Suez  crisis  when  the  U.S.
condemned the joint British-French-Israeli operation in Egypt. Nixon was keenly aware
that the U.S. could not do it alone and required allies (a point not lost for Petersen to
emphasize and note the contemporary failures of the Bush administration on the issue of
working together with allies). The key point that the author focuses on throughout is the
American strategy to have allies, not clients in the Persian Gulf. And it is here that the
countries of Iran and Saudi Arabia enter Petersen’s narrative.
5 One main concern of  the U.S.  and Great  Britain was the strategic importance of  the
Persian Gulf and the countries that comprised the region. Clearly this had a lot to do with
ensuring  that  the  flow  of  oil  would  reach  the  western-industrialized  world  without
interruption.   The  oil  embargo  of  1973  was  a  rude  awakening  for  many  western
governments which had to contend with a host of economic problems created by the
increase in oil  prices.   However,  Petersen endorses a very interesting notion that the
OPEC oil  embargo (which was initiated by Arab states  and others  as  a  result  of  U.S.
support of Israel during the Yom Kippur War) was not a development which ‘surprised’
the U.S.  Specifically,  there was U.S. knowledge of the planned embargo and a muted
response to it from the Nixon administration.  In short, if the U.S. was to have allies in the
Persian Gulf, especially in lieu of the British military withdrawal from the region in 1971,
they (Iran and Saudi Arabia) would have to have the financial capabilities to purchase
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military  equipment,  ideally  from  American  defense  contractors.   To  enable  these
countries to make these purchases “Nixon deliberately broke up the long and successful
partnership  between  the  major  western  oil  companies  and  the  western  powers,  to
increase oil prices so that rapidly increasing oil revenues could pay for the necessary
military hardware”  (3).  Linked to this change in the cost of energy and in accordance
with U.S. designs was the intended effect of reducing Japanese and Western European
economic growth so that the U.S. would maintain its economic hegemony in the world
(27).   This pursuit of short term interests over long term stability and security was the
hallmark of the Nixon-Kissinger foreign policy-making team.  Their version of realpolitik
as practiced in the Persian Gulf region through a reliance on Iran and Saudi Arabia was
built on a foundation of sand which the U.S. in the years to follow would ultimately face
as ‘blowback’—that is, the unintended consequences of foreign policy actions taken in
which the American public was not privy to.  (The classic example would be U.S. support
for anti-Russian mujahideen in Afghanistan which included among their numbers a man
by the name of Osama Bin Laden).
6 In  the  process  of  articulating  these  positions,  Petersen  moves  the  reader  around
chronologically,  providing  the  essential  post-World  War  II  groundwork  and  probing
beyond the 1970s into the contemporary period. He carefully weaves a diplomatic history
of the region which for some readers might be somewhat unappealing.  This is perhaps
the  single  shortcoming  of  this  book.   Alongside  the  traditional,  standard  diplomatic
historical discourse centered on realist/neorealist models, critical theoretical approaches
with a  post-structuralist  flavor could have been incorporated.   The inclusion of  such
perspectives  would  have  added  a  distinctive  dimension  to  Petersen’s  narrative.
 Regardless, the desired effect of bridging the past and present and to account for some of
the dismal realities that exist today in the Middle East is achieved in a very convincing
and compelling manner.  Throughout this very informed narrative is the underlying
theme that behind the scenes both the U.S. and Great Britain manipulated regimes in the
region for their own national interests and the maintenance of Western hegemony, in
short,  making the Persian Gulf an “Anglo-American lake.”  This message, that despite
over a half a century of intensified relations and interventions in the region, that both
powers have failed to solve the area’s problems, is a message that needs to be heeded if
long term stability and security for the region is to ever be achieved.
Joseph Michael Gratale, The American College of Thessaloniki
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